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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
V. Conclusions
The new law will probably cure many of the abuses practiced
by unscrupulous creditors. Regarding the dischargeability of debts,
the most notable change is that the creditor will not be able to use
the ignorance or poverty of the debtor to obtain judgments in the
state courts. However, due to the fact that many details are left out
of the new law, especially with regard to jury trial and collateral
issues which may be considered in determining dischargeabilityr
a good deal of case testing and practical application will be needed
before the precise contours of the law can be discerned.
Stephen P. Swisher
51 Consider for example the issue of whether the bankruptcy count will
have jurisdiction to determine tax issues as they come up in dischargeability.
Constitutional Law-Disclosure of
Journalist's Confidential
News Sources
Earl Caldwell, a black newspaper reporter for the New York
Times, was subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury con-
cerning his knowledge of activities of the Black Panther Party.
The information sought by the government was secured by Cald-
well through interviews with various party officers and spokesmen.
Caldwell and the Times contended the first amendment precluded
disclosure, and that compelled appearance before the grand jury
would have a chilling effect on first amendment freedoms. Accord-
ingly, they asked that the subpoena be quashed; or in the alterna-
tive, be limited to protect Caldwell's confidential news sources.
After making a preliminary standing ruling," a California District
Court held that Caldwell, as everyone else, had a public duty to
appear before a grand jury when subpoenaed; but that under the
circumstances he was entitled to a qualified privilege of confiden-
1The district court initially referred to the now familar "personal stake
in the outcome" standing criteria of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Yet the
court upheld the standing of the New York Times to join with Caldwell on the
basis of Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970). In Camp, the Court held the personal "stake" need not be a strict
legal interest, such as a property interest. Accordingly, for the purpose of
standing, it was held sufficient for the party seeking relief to show the chal-
lenged action has and will cause him "injury in fact, economic or otherwise."
Id. at 152.
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tiality for the protection of his news sources. Specifically, the order
of the district court stated: (1) that Caldwell would not be requir-
ed to reveal confidential associations, sources, or information
received except information given for public disclosure; and (2)
that the court would sustain a government motion for modifica-
tion of its order upon the showing of a compelling and overriding
national interest requiring Caldwell's testimony which could not
be served by alternate means.2
The district court decision apparently constituted a major vic-
tory for journalists. Precedent in this area had indicated that a
journalist must not only attend grand jury proceedings when sub-
poenaed but also must answer all questions asked of him by counsel
as well. Yet, unsatisfied with an apparently favorable ruling from
which the government failed to appeal2 Caldwell refused to appear
before the grand jury and was cited for contempt by the district
court. Caldwell and the Times appealed the contempt citation,
contending that Caldwell should not have been ordered to attend
the grand jury proceeding. Parting with precedent, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held the public's first amendment right to
be informed may outweigh a governmental request for the journal-
ist's appearance before a grand jury; and that under the circum-
stances, Caldwell's mere appearance before the grand jury might
destroy his capacity to report on activities of the Black Panther
Party. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970) .4
Anyone familiar with the complicated development of jour-
nalist privilege law will recognize that Caldwell marks a signifi-
cant departure from prior decisions. Never before has a fed-
eral court held that first amendment freedoms outweigh a jour-
nalist's duty to appear before a grand jury. The decision was not
based on a journalist privilege statute, nor was it consistent with
common law precedent.
2Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 360 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
" The failure of the government to appeal may be explained by a press
release from Attorney General Mitchell. This release contained new Depart-
ment of Justice guidelines for subpoenas to members of the news media.
Address by John N. Mitchell (House of Delegates of the American Bar, Asso-
ciation, August 10, 1970). Among other things, Attorney General Mitchell
stated that the Department of Justice would no longer utilize the press as a
springboard for investigations.
4 The case name was changed from Application of Caldwell to Caldwell v.
United States upon appeal to the circuit court. An appeal from the circuit
court holding was filed in December, 1970, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
1971]
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Prior to Caldwell the leading journalist privilege case was
Garland v. Torre.5 Although an apparently contrary result was
reached in Garland, the two cases are factually distinguishable. In
Garland the identity of the news source was an essential element
of the cause of action, and alternate means of identifying the news
source had been exhausted. In comparison, the government did not
disclose the subject, direction, or scope of the grand jury examina-
tion of Caldwell. The government's only justification for its exa-
mination of Caldwell was that members of the Black Panther
Party had possibly engaged in criminal activities. Furthermore, the
government did not contend that alternative investigative pro-
cedures had been exhausted. In Caldwell the court recognized that
citizens normally have a duty to appear when subpoenaed and that
grand jury proceedings are typically secret, wide-ranging and open-
ended affairs. Nevertheless, the court effectively held that a speci-
fic crime must be charged, and that alternative investigative
methods must be exhausted before freedom of the press could be
jeopardized. Because Caldwell was a case of first impression, the
court stressed the narrowness of its holding, noting: (1) the Black
Panther Party was an unusually sensitive news source; (2) Cald-
well enjoyed a unique relationship with the Black Panther Party;
and (3) news of Black Panther activities was of great public im-
portance in a time of widespread national dissent.0
Since the Caldwell decision only partially defined the phrases
"compelling and overridding national interest" and "alternate
means," one can only speculate as to how these concepts will be
applied.7 In Caldwell the court distinguished the Garland decision
and acknowledged that evidence which related to the heart of a
claim would constitute an overriding interest. The author of a
proposed legislative draft evidently believed a compelling and
overriding national interest would exist if national security were at
stake, or if an important public interest were threatened s Based up-
on Garland a compelling and overriding national interest would be
5 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 910 (1958). In this famous
case Judy Garland attempted to sue a CBS executive who allegedly had made
defamatory remarks about her to journalist Marie Torre. When questioned in
court, Marie Torre refused to identify the CBS executive and was sentenced
for contempt.
6 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 1970).
7 Resolution of conflicting governmental and first amendment claims al-
ways involves a balancing of competing interests. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126
(1959).
8 6 HARv. J. Lxnis. 341 (1969).
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demonstrated if another constitutional provision outweighed con-
flicting first amendment interests, or if the identity of the news
source or his information were essential to the maintenance or de-
fense of a civil or criminal case. The meaning of "alternate means"
is much easier to grasp-all other known means of obtaining the
desired information must have been exhausted before a journalist
could be compelled to testify. The inference from this principle is
that freedom of the press should be impaired only as a last resort.
The underlying premise supporting the holding of Caldwell
is that newsgathering is entitled to first amendment protection.
Never before has a judicial decision explicitly supported this pro-
position. Until this decision, only publication and circulation have
been expressly included within the scope of the first amendment.9
The Caldwell opinion scarcely mentioned the controversy regard-
ing this premise, suggesting it was an accepted fact that news-
gathering was entitled to constitutional protection. However, prior
decisions reached an opposite conclusion. 0
The main arguments against recognizing constitutional pro-
tection of newsgathering are: (1) a journalist privilege was not
recognized under common law; (2) everyone has a duty to appear
before a grand jury; and (3) evidentiary privileges should be
restricted." Proponents of constitutional protection for newsgath-
ering have pointed out that the first amendment provided greater
protection to freedom of the press than existed under common
law1 2 and that compelled disclosure would jeopardize confidential
journalist-source relationships which are indispensable to gathering,
analyzing, and publishing news articles.1" Moreover, elementary
logic dictates that news must be gathered before it can be published
9 See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931).
1o See, e.g., Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); State v.
Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968). In
Buchanan a student newspaper editor subjected to district attorney question-
ing before a grand jury was required to reveal the names of seven confidential
news sources who were users of marijuana. This recent case is representative
of precedent prior to Caldwell. Miss Buchanan used a similar constitutional
argument to no avail.
"-See 8 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE (McNaughton rev. 1961).
'James Madison wrote: "the state of the press ... under the common law,
cannot ... be the standard of its freedom in the United States." VI WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADIsoN 1790-1802, 887. In Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265
(1941), the Court said "Itjhe only conclusion supported by history is.that the
unqualified prohibitions laid down by the framers were intended to give to
liberty of the press, as to the other liberties, the broadest scope that could be
countenanced in an orderly society."
"3Siebert 9- Ryniker, Press Winning Fight to Guard Sources, 67 Editor and
Publisher 9 (Sept. 9, 1984).
19711
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and disseminated. 14 Support for constitutional protection has been
expressed in the past in dissenting opinions.15 The recognition of
a journalist privilege under proper circumstances would seem a
reasonable extension of recent Supreme Court decisions granting
publishers wider freedom to publish news without fear of libel
suits.16
Of great significance in the Caldwell decision was the fact that
the government had the burden of showing a compelling and over-
riding national interest before first amendment considerations were
outweighed. The court could have placed the burden on the
journalist to show why he should not be compelled to testify in a
given situation. This would have been more in line with prece-
dent and possibly more reasonable since the journalist would al-
ways be in a better position to know why testimony should be
withheld. Nevertheless, the court decided to place the burden on
the government, thereby strongly favoring freedom of the press
over -competing interests.
Even with a full appreciation of the importance of first a-
mendment freedoms, one could have a lingering doubt about the
desirability of a journalist privilege. 17 The news media has seemed
robust enough without a journalist privilege-so much so that some
favor more press restrictions rather than greater press freedom.
Everyone is aware of the serious congestion problems plaguing
our state and federal courts. A complicated, time-consuming case-
by-case weighing of competing interests can only lead to increased
court congestion. Furthermore, would a journist privilege
have any real effect if some sources are identified in court and some
are not? A news source could never be sure of remaining anonymous
the next time he gave a journalist information. If a journalist can-
not constantly insure the anonymity of his sources, of what value
is the privilege? It may be a privilege of illusory value at best.
14 In Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument For Newsmen Con-
cealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 18, 31 (1969), the authors stated: "If
newspapers are restrained in gathering news, obviously they cannot print the
news which they were prevented from gathering."
15 See, e.g., Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); In re Good-
fader's Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961) (Justice Mizuha's dissenting
opinion is an excellent review of opposing arguments); In re Mack, 386
Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 1002 (1956).
16 See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (a public figure
bringing a libel action must show an extreme departure from normal publish-
ing standards); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (a public
official must prove actual malice in a libel action).
17 See generally Beaver, The Newsman's Code, The Claim of Privilege and
Everyman's Right to Evidence, 47 ORE. L. REv. 243 (1968).
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On the other hand, there are additional arguments in support
of recognizing a journalist privilege. Without a privilege, jour-
nalists are placed in a dilemma; they can either violate their code
of ethics and identify their news sources, or they can refuse to
identify their sources and suffer a contempt sentence.' 8 If they
identify their news sources, they risk losing future stories and in
some cases subject themselves to possible harm. Journalists have, in
the past, elected to accept contempt sentences almost without ex-
ception. However, judges have apparently recognized this can be
unfair to journalists and have made the contempt sentences rela-
tively light. It could be argued that a journalist privilege is analo-
gous to a criminal informer privilege. The criminal informer pri-
vilege has existed for a long time without adversely affecting judi-
cial administration. 1 For a number of years privilege advocates
have been talking about the deterrent effects of compulsory dis-
closure on freedom of expression 2 and the importance of anony-
mity where unpopular views are involved.0' Paradoxically, as
pointed out in Caldwell, prosecuting attorneys in many instances
would never be aware of criminal activities if it were not for articles
by journalists. Yet, prosecuting attorneys expect journalists to re-
veal their news sources, thereby probably eliminating future articles
based on information from those sources. Journalists are not De-
partment of Justice investigators, neither are they policemen. Per-
haps such functions should not be imposed upon them. 2'
The entire journalist privilege question might be more pro-
perly settled through legislation." Recognizing the arguments for
and against a journalist privilege, the author of a well-drafted
statute could resolve the great bulk of the disagreements. At the
1s See Note, The Right of a Newsman to Refrain from Divulging the
Sources of His Information, 36 VA. I- REV. 61, 62 (1950).
19 The criminal informer privilege is the government's privilege to with-
hold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information concerning
violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. The
purpose of the privilege is the furtherance of the public interest in effective
law enforcement. Roviaro v. United States, 355 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
20 See Note, The Constitutional Right to Anopymity: Free Speech, Dis-
closure and the Devil, 70 YALE L. J. 1084 (1961).
21 See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960); Comment, 82 HAv.
. REv. 1384 (1969).
22 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 1970).
23 At least thirteen states now have some form of journalist privilege
statute:
ALA . CODE, tit. 7, § 370 (1958);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Cum. Supp. 1966);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964) ;
CAL. EVIDENCE CODE, § 1970 (1966);
IND. ANN. STAT. §2-1733 (Cum. Supp. 1966);
19711
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present time West Virginia does not have a journalist privilege
statute, nor has the writer found any decisions involving a jour-
nalist privilege controversy.24 However, an examination of the in-
dex to the West Virginia Code discloses numerous statutory pri-
vileges, including the familiar attorney-client 25 and husband-wife z
privileges, and numerous less familiar privilege relationships.27 It
would not be surprising if a journalist privilege bill were intro-
duced at a session of the legislature in the near future. It is almost
a certainty that some West Virginia cases will appear involving
journalist privilege questions.
In the absence of a statute, courts are left with the balancing
of competing interests.The Supreme Court has granted certiorari
in Caldwell and will shed more light on this controversial subject
in the near future. It will be especially interesting to analyze the
position of Mr. Justice Stewart because he wrote the Garland
opinion as a judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. In that opinion he suggested the following guide-
lines for resolving conflicts in this sensitive area:
Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1963) ;
LA. REV. STAT. § § 45:1451 to 45:1454 (Cum. Supp. 1965);
MD. CODE ANN. art. 35, § 2 (1965);
MIcH. STAT. ANN. §28.945 (1) C. L. Mich. 1948, 767.5a 1P. A. 1951, No.
276] (1954);
MONT. REV. CODE, § §93-601-1, 93-601-2 (1964);
N. J. STAT. ANN. § § 2A:84A-21, 2A:84A-29 (Cum. Supp. 1966);
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § § 2739.04, 2739.12 (Supp. 1966);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Cum. Supp. 1965).
24 Lack of West Virginia cases may be accounted for by the previously well-
settled rule against a journalist privilege.
25 W. VA. CODE ch. 50, art. 6, § 10 (Michie 1966) (Justices' Courts).
26 W. VA. CODE ch. 57, art. 3, §4 (Michie 1966).
27 The following is a listing of privileged communications:
1. Accidents (Accident reports to be confidential), W. VA. CODE
ch. 17c, art. 4, § 13 (Michie 1966) ;
2. Adoption (Records and papers), W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 4, §4
(Michie 1966) ;
3. Attorney at Law, W. VA. CODE ch. 50, art. 6, § 10 (Michie 1966);
4, Hospitals (Information not to be disclosed by health depart-
ment), W. VA. CODE ch. 16, art. 5B, § 10 (Michie 1966);
5. Husband and Wife, W. VA. CODE ch. 57, art. 3, § 4 (Michie
1966); and W. VA. CODE ch. 48, art. 9, § 18 (Michie 1966);
6. Income Tax (Secrecy of xeturns), W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 21,
§ 80 (Michie 1966);
7. Inheritance and Transfer Taxes (Reports to tax commission-
er), W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 11, § 13 (Michie 1966);
8. Labor (Confidential information), W. VA. CODE ch. 21, art.
8, § 11 (Michie 1966); (Reports of department), W. VA. CODE ch. 21,
art. IA, § I (Michie 1966);
9. Narcotics (Divulging knowledge obtained from inspection
prohibited), W. VA. CODE ch. 16, art. SA, § 16 (Michie 1966);
10. Physicians and Surgeons (Justices' courts), W. VA. CODE ch.
50, art. 6 §§ 10, 11 (Michie 1966);
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But freedom of the press, precious and vital through it is
to a free society, is not an absolute. What must be deter-
mined is whether the interest to be served by compelling
the testimony of the witness in the present case justifies
some impairment of this First Amendment freedom. That
kind of determination often presents a 'delicate and diffi-
cult' task.28
Roger D. Graham
11. Prenatal Examinations (Report of laboratory), W. VA. CODE
ch. 16, art. 4A, § 3 (Michie 1966);
12. Prostitution (Procuring female for house of prostitution W.VA.
CODE ch. 61, art. 8, § 7 (Michie 1966); (Marriage of prostitute and ac-
cussed), W. VA. CoDE ch. 61, art. 8, § 8 (Michie 1966).
13. Public Assistance and Relief (Lists and records), W. VA.
CODE ch. 9, art. 11, § 16 (Michie 1966);
14. Records and Papers (Confidential records), W. VA. CODE ch.
5, art. 8, § 13 (Michie 1966);
15. Religious Organizations (Communications to clergy), W. VA.
CODE ch. 50, art. 6, §§ 10, 11 (Michie 1966);
16. Sales Tax (When information obtained is confidential), W.
VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 15, § 27 (Michie 1966) ;
17. Tax Commissioner (No disclosure as to individual business
information), W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 1, § 4a (Michie 1966);
28 Garland v. Torre, 259, F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
910 (1958).
Constitutional Law-Does A Private
College's Response To State
Legislation Constitute State Action?
"College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the
physicial and moral welfare, and mental training of the
pupils, and... to that end they may ... make any rule or
regulation for the government, or betterment of their
pupils that a parent could for the same purpose."'
Wagner College, a privately supported Lutheran-affiliated lib-
eral arts institution, expelled twenty-four of its students for refusing
to vacate the office of the Dean. Plaintiffs were members of "Black
Concern", a campus group organized to promote the interests of
black students. Plaintiffs visited the Dean's office to arrange a
meeting with Wagner College's president. When they failed to ar-
I Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1913) (emphasis
added). A rigid doctrine in loco parentis is probably no longer a viable prin-
ciple in the student-college relationship. See Moore v. Student Affairs Comm.,
284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280,
286 (D. Coo. 1968); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747,
756 (W.D. La. 1968). See also Note, An Overview: The Private University
and Due Process, 1970 Duxx L. J. 795, 804 (1970).
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